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IIA. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Section 41-6-44 (Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended): It is 
unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any person 
to operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two 
hours after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the 
person is under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 1 
KELLY S. BARNHART, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. 
1 Case No. 920357-CA 
\ Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. STATEMENT SHOWING THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
APPELLATE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD 
OF REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES 
POINT ON APPEAL: WAS THE DEFENDANT IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL 
CONTROL OF A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL TO A DEGREE WHICH RENDERED HIM INCAPABLE OF SAFELY 
DRIVING A MOTOR VEHICLE AS DEFINED BY SECTION 41-6-44, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (195 3 AS AMENDED)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Under the existing facts, the trial court 
entered a finding that the Appellant was in "actual physical 
control" of a motor vehicle as set forth in the applicable statute 
(41-6-44 U.C.A.). The standard for appellate review of factual 
findings affords great deference to the trial court's view of the 
evidence unless the trial court has misapplied the law or its 
findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence. Pagano v. 
Walker, 539 P.2d 452 (Utah 1975); Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 
1980) . In addition, when a matter is presented to the trial court 
on stipulated facts, which are "the functional equivalent" of 
findings of fact, the appellate court will not defer to the trial 
court's findings, Dover Elevator Co. v. Hill Mangum Invests., 766 
P.2d 424, 426 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). Where the facts are not in 
material dispute, the* interpretation placed thereon by the trial 
court becomes a question of law, which is not conclusive on appeal. 
Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 739 P. 2d 
1133, 1136 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On stipulated fcicts, the Defendant was convicted in Fifth 
District Court for Washington County of the offense of being in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely 
driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended). (See attached Addendum). Defendant 
appeals claiming that he was not guilty of that offense under the 
facts existing in the case and under the law as defined by the 
aforementioned statute and the case law construing the same. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 24, 1992, sometime between the hours of 8:00 p.m., and 
9:00 p.m. Appellant drove his girl friend Tamila's blue Buick 
automobile to the parking lot of Lin's AG (a supermarket) in St. 
George (Tr. 4) . Appellant and his said girl friend had planned to 
meet at that point and time the previous day to do some shopping 
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(Tr. 4). Up to the time of arrival at the parking lot the Appellant 
had consumed two cans of 3.2 beer, apparently Budweiser by trade 
name (Tr. 4-5) . The trial court, in its findings, found that only 
two cans of beer had been consumed by Appellant up to his arrival at 
the parking lot (Tr. 8). 
Between his time of arrival at the parking lot and until the 
police subsequently arrived between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. the 
Appellant consumed seven cans of beer while sitting in the 
automobile waiting for his girl friend to arrive (Tr. 5, 9). During 
this timer the vehicle was not moved from its original parking spot 
(Tr. 5) , the keys were left in the ignition (Tr. 5, 8) , the engine 
was cold (Tr. 5) , and when the police arrived the Appellant was 
asleep in the driver's seat of the automobile with his head laying 
back (Tr. 5). The headlights of the vehicle were not on (Tr. 9) and 
the trial court specifically found that there was no evidence that 
the engine had been running for at least an hour prior to the time 
the police officer arrived (Tr. 9) . The police had been called to 
the scene because the store owner and operator had become suspicious 
of the Appellant's motor vehicle parking for so long in his parking 
lot (Tr. 8). 
After being arrested at the scene, the Appellant was given an 
intoxilyzer test of his blood alcohol and the test results were .18 
(Tr. 10). Based upon this test result, the court specifically found 
that the Appellant was under the influence of alcohol to a degree 
that violated Section 41-6-44 U.C.A. at the time the police arrested 
him (Tr. 19). The court also found that the Appellant was 
unconscious at the time the officers appeared on the scene (Tr. 19), 
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that the Appellant was in the driver's seat at that time (Tr. 19) , 
that in all likelihood the car's engine had not been running for in 
excess of an hour (Tr. 20), that the Appellant was the vehicle's 
sole occupant (Tr. 20) , that the intent and plan of the Appellant 
and his girl friend was that she would drive the subject motor 
vehicle away (Tr. 20), that there was no intervening fact other than 
the alcohol itself prohibiting the Appellant from starting and 
moving the automobile (Tr. 20) and that there was no evidence to 
indicate that the Appellant was under the influence of alcohol to a 
degree that would violate the law at the time he drove the 
automobile to the parking lot (Tr. 20). 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The facts, as stated and found by the trial court, do not 
support a conviction of violation of Section 41-6-44 U.C.A. as 
Appellant was not in "actual physical control" of the motor vehicle 
as defined by the statute and the case law construing the same. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
As is readily apparent, the problem in this case is determining 
if the Appellant was in "actual physical control" of a motor vehicle 
as described in the applicable statute (41-6-44 U.C.A.). The Utah 
case law has attempted to define this. 
In State of Utah v. Charles Bugger, 25 Ut. 2d 404, 483 P.2d 441 
(Utah 1971), the accused was in his automobile which was completely 
off the traveled portion of the highway with the motor not running. 
The accused was asleep at the time the officer arrived and the 
officer had some difficulty in awakening him. 
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The Utah Supreme Court determined that the accused was not in 
actual physical control of the motor vehicle as required by the 
statute and noted that "The defendant at the time of his arrest was 
not controlling the vehicle, nor was he exercising any dominion over 
it." 
A different decision was arrived at in Garcia v. Schwendimanf 
646 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982). In the Garcia case, the accused was in 
his motor vehicle attempting to start its motor. At the front of 
the Garcia motor vehicle was a fence preventing it from moving 
forward and a third person had positioned his own vehicle to the 
rear of the Garcia1 s vehicle so it could not be moved to the rear. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated that "...under the facts before us, 
where a motorist occupied the driver's position behind the steering 
wheel, with possession of the ignition key and with the apparent 
ability to start and move the vehicle, we hold that there has been 
an adequate showing of actual physical control under our implied 
consent statute." The court went on to say that the fact that 
Garcia could not move his automobile because of a fence in front and 
a vehicle to his rear did not alter its opinion. 
The Utah case of Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P. 2d 778 (Utah 
1986) , contains a little different fact situation. The officer 
found Lopez in his pickup parked by a public telephone booth 
adjacent to Sunnyside City Hall at 3:00 a.m. The truck's motor was 
not running but there were vehicle tracks from the truck in the 
freshly fallen snow. Lopez was sitting in the driver's seat with 
his head resting on the steering wheel. When the door to the truck 
was opened Lopez fell out of the truck and the officer had to catch 
him. Lopez smelled of alcohol and was "drooling", had very poor 
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balance and needed support to stand. The officer removed the keys 
from the truck's ignition and had to turn them to get them out. 
At the time of the arrest, Lopez, in answer to a question, 
asking him if he was driving, stated "...I was waiting for a phone 
call." Later at trial, Lopez stated his wife had been driving when 
the battery died. He was just waiting for her to bring a car to tow 
the truck home. 
The trial court found that Lopez was in actual physical control 
of the vehicle and the Utah Supreme Court agreed. In reaching its 
decisionr the Supreme Court stated that "The trial court here found 
that there were tire tracks leading up to the vehicle, that the 
vehicle had to have reached its point of rest apparently on its own 
power and that Lopez had failed the field sobriety tests." By 
implication, it appears both the trial court and the Supreme Court 
were convinced that Lopez had driven the automobile to the point of 
arrest and done so while under the influence. 
In Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) , 
the defendant, in the early morning hours of June 30f 1987, drove to 
the Richfield Quality Inn seeking a room. After being informed that 
there were no vacancies, he returned to his truck in the parking lot 
and went to sleep. Subsequently, he was discovered by a Sevier 
County Sheriff who found defendant's truck with the engine off and 
the headlights on. The doors were unlocked and the keys were in the 
ignition. Defendant was asleep on the seat, with his head toward 
the passenger door and a blanket over him. Within thirty minutes of 
his arrest, defendant submitted to an intoxilyzer test that 
registered his blood alcohol level at .21%. 
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In the Walker case, the Utah Court of Appeals stated that it 
must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether 
defendant was in actual physical control of his vehicle. The court 
cited State v. Buggery in stating that an intoxicated motorist 
asleep in his car was no in actual physical control of his vehicle. 
It also called the Bugger fact situation "meager". The Court of 
Appeals then went on to talk about the positioning of the defendant 
in the driver's seat as being a common element to all of the cases 
that have found actual physical control of a motionless vehicle but 
then added that "...positioning in the driver's seat is a 
significant but not necessarily the determining factor in 
ascertaining actual physical control." 
The Court of Appeals also stated in Walker that the possession 
of the ignition key and the ability to start and move the vehicle 
are relevant factors. 
Furtherf and important to this case, the court in Walker stated 
that "How the car got to its present resting place is an additional 
critical factor." 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Walker then went on to talk about 
the placing of the ignition keys in the automobile as being in 
actual physical control of the motor vehicle and cited the Florida 
case of Fieselman v. State, 537 So. 2d at 603. The Court of Appeals 
quoted the Fieselman case as saying "...a reasonable inference can 
be drawn that Fieselman, while intoxicated, placed the keys in the 
ignition and thus was at least at that moment in actual physical 
control of the vehicle while intoxicated." In Walker, the Utah 
Court of Appeals, in referring to the quoted statement in Fieselman 
stated "We believe that such an inference can be drawn since a 
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person who has placed keys in the ignition of a vehicle may be as 
much in actual physical control of the vehicle as a person seated 
behind the wheel of the vehicle." 
After some discussion of the fact that the keys were in the 
ignition of the subject vehiclef the Utah Court of Appeals went on 
to state in Walker that "Lastly, we point out that evidence that the 
key was in the ignition does not inexorably lead to the conclusion 
that the defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle." 
If counsel for Appellant is understanding the cases correctly, 
it appears that what the appellate courts are saying, in attempting 
to make a determination of "actual physical control", is that there 
is no particular fact to be considered as determinative of the issue 
but all facts must be looked at in their totality. 
In this case, there is no evidence that the Appellant was 
intoxicated at the time he parked his vehicle in the Lin's AG 
parking lot. Because of this, it must be presumed that he was not 
intoxicated at that time. Thus, his leaving the ignition keys in 
the ignition at the time of parking was an act or failure to act 
made by the Appellant while he was not intoxicated. 
While the stipulated facts are that at the time the officer 
arrived at the scene the Appellant was asleep in the driver's seat, 
there is no evidence that he ever touched any of the operating 
controls of the vehicle during the time he was seated in the 
automobile drinking. Further, the trial court specifically found 
with no objection from the prosecutor, that the intent of the 
Appellant was to have his girl friend move the automobile from the 
scene. 
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In Richfield v. Walker, the Utah Court of Appeals found the 
defendant to be in actual physical control of his vehicle. It is to 
be pointed out, however, that facts indicated that the defendant 
drove the vehicle to its position in the Richfield Quality Inn 
parking lot while in an intoxicated condition. As the court said, 
"To focus exclusively upon the fact that the driver was not sitting 
in the driver's seat or that he was asleep and to ignore other 
relevant factors, as the defendant would have us do, is illogical." 
The legislature and all of us are concerned that the drinking 
drivers be kept off the road and the highways and the use be kept as 
safe as possible. On the other hand, there are certain necessary 
and proper uses of the automobile that should not be excessively 
interfered with. For instance, one can envision a situation when a 
person under the influence leaves a bar in the middle of a cold 
winter night, gets in his car for purposes of sleeping as he cannot 
move it because of his condition, starts the engine to run the 
heater to keep warm while he is sleeping, makes no other moves to 
move the vehicle, goes to sleep, and is subsequently arrested by an 
officer for being in actual physical control. While some may 
consider the officer's actions in this regard proper, the only 
alternative the poor sole that was asleep in his warm automobile may 
have is to freeze to death in the cold. 
Somewhere a proper balance should be struck. Appellant believes 
it is his case in which such balance should be found. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Taking into account all the circumstances in their totality it 
is Appellant's position that his conviction for being in actual 
-9-
physical control of a motor vehicle to a degree that violates the 
law should be reversed. ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ) d day of September, 1992. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of 
Appellant's brief, postage pre-paid on this 7^ <£J day of September, 
1992, to Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General^ 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
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FIFTH DISTRICT? Yc 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF 
STATE OF UTAH JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
BARNHART, KELLY S CASE NO: 925500799 
1660 W SUNSET DOB: 05/21/62 
G-l TAPE: 920263COUNT: 2740 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 DATE: 05/04/92 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 41-6-44 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Bench 
Fine: 900.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 60 DA Susp: 50 DA ACS: 0 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
Fine Description: Surcharge - 85% 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
TRACKING: 
Other 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
06/30/92 
Due: 
Due: 
Due: 
486.49 
413.51 
900.00 
CALENDAR: 
REVIEW HEARING 05/27/92 01:30 PM in rm D with SHUMATE, JAMES L. 
BARNHART, KELLY S CASE NO: 925500799 PAGE 2 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be 
900.00 Suspended: .00 
Suspended: 50 DAYS 
Chrg: DUI 
Fine Amount: 
Jail: 60 DAYS 
ONE YEAR PROBATION 
1. 60 DAYS JAIL/50 STAYED/ 10 IMPOSED BEGIN 5-8-92 AT 6 PM 
2. $900 FINE DUE 6-30-92 @ $100 MONTH 
3. COMMIT NO VIOLATIONS 
4. DRINKING DRIVING COURSE IMPOSED 
UPON FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL, COURT WILL ISSUE CERTICATE OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO STAY IMPOSITION SNT. COURT GRANTS 20 DAY 
STAY OF SNT UNTIL JUDGMENT SUBMITTED. PAPER REVIEW IS SET FOR 
5-27-92 1:30 PM- NO APPEARANCE NECESSARY IF APPEAL HAS BEEN 
FILED 
REV scheduled for 05/27/92 at 0130 P in room D with JLS 
BY THE CO 
JUDJ 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 3 0 DAYS 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 
wi GBftetffT COURT 
• 0 ^ 
